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Much research in recent years has been devoted to the 
identification and measurement of creative abilities. It was 
postulated that Werner's orthogenetic principle, in which development 
is conceptualized as proceeding from a state of relative lack of 
differentiation of functions to a state of increasing different­
iation, articulation, and hierarchic integration of functions, 
might be applied to cognitive development in order to provide a 
useful model for investigating such abilities. A parallel interest 
of the investigator was the use of the Stroop Color-Word Test as a 
measure of hierarchic integration of cognitive functions (here 
called cognitive flexibility).
Three hundred and fifty-nine subjects were screened in order 
to identify three groups of individuals: those both highly 
differentiated (as inferred from level of perceptual field- 
independence) and highly flexible (HFI-HCF), who were hypothesized 
to be the most creative; those highly differentiated but exhibiting 
low flexibility (HFI-LCF), who were hypothesized to exhibit 
moderate levels of creativity; those exhibiting low differentiation 
and low flexibility (LFI-LCF), who were hypothesized to be the 
least creative. However, when these identified subjects were 
administered the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking and the Otis- 
Gamma intelligence test (to assess the contribution of intelligence
ix
to creativity) this hypothesis was not borne out. In fact, the 
HFI-LCF subjects performed most creatively, followed by the 
HFI-HCF and then the LFI-LCF subjects, although none of the 
five creativity score differences were found to be statistically 
significant. These results were discussed in terms of possible 
methodological and conceptual shortcomings and suggestions for 




It is a matter of general agreement that individuals vary on a 
host of dimensions, particular combinations and degrees of those 
dimensions serving to characterize particular individuals. One 
variable which has been the subject of vast amounts of research is 
creativity. This is readily understandable in light of the fact 
that all innovation and advance is rooted in the desire of some, 
if not all, human beings to, in some sense, be creative. Much 
research has focused on attempting to identify what are the core 
characteristics, the "bottom lines" of the creative process, for 
it may be possible to separate creativity from its context. Thus 
we might ask, for example, when a mathematician derives an entirely 
new algorithm, a poet writes a poem that earns considerable praise 
from his colleagues and a teenager solves a vexing mechanical 
problem in an automobile, are there fundamental characteristics 
that are operable in each of these accomplishments? Might we be 
able to reduce these fundamental characteristics down to one or two 
or three which are characteristic of all creative productions?
The first task that arises is to define creativity. It is 
perhaps advisable to operationalize it at this point by the 
rhetorical device of saying creativity is what a creativity test 
measures. More adequate consideration of this question can be
1
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deferred until a sufficient background has been established.
The second task that arises is to develop the means to measure 
or assess creativity. Schuler (1976) has noted the stages through 
which this undertaking has progressed. Personal accounts or 
self-reports were used at an early stage to study creative 
individuals. Among the more prominent practitioners of this method 
was Sir Francis Galton (Barron, 1969) who, among other things, 
surveyed individuals concerning the vividness of their mental 
imagery. This method gave way to observational studies in which 
individuals attempted to discern what behaviors characterized 
creative individuals by observing such individuals engaging in 
creative undertakings (Torrance, 1962). Finally, there began 
controlled scientific studies involving experimental manipulation, 
use of sophisticated statistical techniques, control of extraneous 
variables and systematic theorization (Guilford, 1959; Torrance, 
1962; Wallach and Kogan, 1965 a, b) .
Though many standardized measures of creativity (e.g. Torrance 
1974) have been the subject of much research and have been well 
normed, most suffer from several serious flaws. The first of these 
is a lack of genuine objectivity. It is often the case that the 
subject must perform tasks which the scorer must attempt to 
classify according to apparent degree of creativity in the response 
In spite of firm guidelines as to how to score a response, so long 
as the scorer must make judgements from time to time concerning the 
quality of the response, the instrument cannot be said to be wholly 
objective. It is thus not surprising that such instruments usually
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exhibit less than overwhelming test-retest and inter-rater 
reliabilities. For example, one subscore (figural fluency) of 
the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1974) has shown 
a test-retest reliability of .50. Even so, most existing measures 
require considerable training and practice for scorers to achieve 
the claimed levels of reliability.
Another flaw is the laborious effort required to administer 
and score some existing measures of creativity. Ideally, such an 
instrument should be amenable to group administration and rapid 
scoring. This would greatly reduce the amount of effort necessary 
to conduct adequate research on this topic and thereby free trained 
individuals for more pressing pursuits.
Another difficulty with existing measures is their task- 
specificity. For example, if an instrument required an individual 
to produce novel block designs, would it be able to assess 
creativity in an individual with considerable verbal skills?
Davis and Belcher (1971) point out additional problems with 
existing measures of creativity: performance on them may be in part 
a function of past experience with particular types of items or 
past achievement; they may be in part a function of the subject's 
intelligence; they may bear no relationship to other measures of 
creativity or what is recognized as creative behavior; they may be 
dependent upon the subject's truthfulness or willingness to expend 
adequate effort in taking the test.
In summary, then, an ideal measure of creativity should be 
objective, highly reliable (both test-retest and inter-rater), easily
4
administered (preferably in groups), easily scored, able to assess 
as broad a spectrum of creative abilities as possible, not 
dependent upon intelligence or past experience, and bear some 
relationship to other measures of creativity.
One current theory concerning the nature of the creative process 
owes much to Werner. Over the course of several publications 
spanning many years (Werner, 1948; 1957; Werner and Kaplan, 1956), 
he postulated a process of cognitive development in which individuals 
are thought to progress from a primitive level in which such functions 
as feeling, perceiving, thinking, learning and language behaviors, 
at first global, diffuse and lacking in articulation between different 
areas, become increasingly differentiated from one another. Thus 
what was once an amorphous whole lacking in structure is broken 
up into discrete, well-articulated parts, a process he called 
differentiation. As an example, what we call feeling may have once 
been experienced as the undifferentiated subjective correlates of 
sympathetic nervous system arousal. The individual may then move 
toward differentiation of several subjective feelings; for example, 
one feeling may be labelled joy, another anticipation, and another 
rapture. Though the physiological responses in each might be 
identical, the accompanying cognitions are different.
Werner proposed the further notion that as differentiation 
proceeds, the various levels of functioning are hierarchically 
integrated such that "operations characteristic of lower levels of 
functioning are subordinated to operations characteristic of higher 
levels. Primitive operations are capable of being inhibited yet
5
used in the service of operations indigenous to developmentslly 
increased maturity" (Bloomberg, 1967). As the degree of 
differentiation increased, he believed, the extent of hierarchic 
integration increased, the one preceeding the other. It is thus 
characteristic of the highly differentiated person, according to 
this reasoning, that, in employing available functions, one can 
move across the developmental levels that have become differentiated. 
Therefore a perfectly mature adult might, for example, wish to react 
to the tender attentions of a spouse by permitting the feelings 
thereby produced to be experienced in much the same way that a 
hungry infant responds to being fed and cuddled, rather than the 
more stoical response of feeling warm and tender inside while 
maintaining a perfectly blank facial expression.
There have been several outgrowths of Werner's theory. One is 
the work of Witkin and his colleagues (Witkin, et al., 1962) with the 
field independence-dependence dimension. They operationalize 
1 field-independence' (FI) as the ability to "deal with part of an 
organized field independently of the field", as, for example, in 
breaking up an organized visual field and keeping a part of it 
separate from the field (Witkin, et al., 1971). Witkin, et al. 
believe that the hallmark of the field-independent person is a high 
degree of differentiation, manifested as a greater capacity for 
selective attention than that of the field-dependent person, or, to 
use a term that this author feels is more descriptive, the field-
constrained person.
6
Several perceptual tasks have been devised to measure the degree 
to which individuals are field-independent. The three most widely- 
used are the Embedded Figures Tests, the Rod and Frame Test and 
the Body Adjustment Test. The first requires the subject to discern 
simple geometric figures within fields of complex designs. The 
second requires the subject to adjust a luminous rod to a vertical 
position in a darkened room under varying degrees of tilt of a 
luminous surrounding frame. The third requires the subject to 
adjust his/her body to a vertical position when seated in a tilted 
chair in a tilted room.
A vast amount of research has been conducted concerning the 
functioning of field-independent and field-dependent individuals, 
as well as their background experiences and adjustment. Spotts and 
Mackler (1967) summarize and integrate this research as follows:
Field-dependent or "global-field" perceptual 
performers are described as individuals who lack a well- 
developed sense of their own identity and separateness 
from others. During their development these individuals 
have failed to internalize a stable set of standards 
with which they can interpret and react to the world. 
Lacking stable internal frames of reference, field- 
dependents have great difficulty maintaining their 
own "direction" in the face of contradictory expressions 
from other people. Consequently, they look to others 
for support and reassurance and are highly vulnerable 
to external influence, particularly from authoritative 
figures. Global-field persons are postulated as being 
unable to organize and impose structure upon ambiguous 
stimuli. When thrown upon their own resources or 
faced with new and/or unusual situations, they tend to 
become "disrupted" and respond with ineffectual 
behavior. These individuals show a low awareness of 
their own "inner life" and are fearful of their own 
aggressive and sexual impulses. They characteristically 
utilize "primitive" modes of defense such as denial and 
repression. Consequently, they tend to be somewhat
7
anxious and "impulsive" and frequently become confused 
and disorganized under stress. They lack "cognitive 
clarity" and tend to experience themselves and the 
world in a vague, blurred, and unorganized fashion.
While diffuse and poorly integrated functioning 
seems to characterize the adjustment of the field- 
dependent individual, the field-independent person 
falls at the other extreme on these personality 
dimensions. That is, field-independent or "analytic- 
field" perceptual performers are described as having a 
highly developed sense of their own self-identity.
They tend to be regarded by others as socially more 
independent than their field-dependent counterparts 
and evidence a ready capacity to function with little 
environmental support. Field-independents effectively 
organize and structure vague or ambiguous stimuli and 
are likely to adopt a relatively intellectual and 
impersonal approach to problems. They are not 
markedly influenced by authorities but tend rather 
to be guided by their own standards, values, and needs 
even to the point of being isolated from other people. 
These individuals evidence a relatively high awareness 
of their own motives and feelings and are accepting 
of their own aggressive and sexual impulses. In their 
adjustment, field-independents tend to use relatively 
specialized and complex defenses such as isolation 
and intellectualization. Consequently, they may be 
somewhat detached and obsessive and are sometimes 
described as "overcontrolled". They show greater 
cognitive clarity than global-field individuals and 
tend to experience themselves and the world in a 
discrete, organized and articulate fashion.
Another outgrowth of Werner's theory is the concept of adaptive 
cognitive regression or flexibility postulated by Pine and Holt 
(1960) and Wild (1965). They hold that some individuals are, to 
varying degrees, capable of utilizing cognitive operations 
characteristic of a primitive level of development (akin to what 
is sometimes referred to as primary process thinking) in a 
controlled and adaptive manner without sacrificing the 
accessibility of higher mental processes (akin to so-called secondary
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process thinking). This notion is in large part a restatement of 
Werner's concept of hierarchic integration: as individuals 
mature, they develop more mature (that is, well-articulated and 
symbolic) cognitive functions in contrast to the previous more 
primitive (that is, global, diffuse and concrete) ones. The 
dimension on which people vary is the ability to regress when 
appropriate through a hierarchy of cognitive functions to those 
that are characteristic of a primitive level of development, 
in contrast to the normal state of hierarchic integration, in which 
"operations characteristic of lower levels of functioning are 
subordinated to operations characteristic of higher levels" 
(Bloomberg, 1967). (A folk adage yields the tidbit that insight 
and wisdom often proceed "out of the mouths of babes and fools": 
perhaps it is because they are babes, and can view things as babes, 
that they experience the insights that others don't).
The nature of the relationships of field-independence and 
cognitive flexibility (CF) (and, by implication, hierarchic 
integration) to creativity has been speculated upon by Bloomberg 
(1967). He hypothesizes that a field-independent orientation should 
in general serve to facilitate creative productions, for the 
inability to rise above embedding contexts and perceive units of a 
field (whether that field be a perceptual field, a mass of competing 
cognitions, or any other field) as discrete would certainly on the 
face hamper the emergence of novel productions. However, a field- 
independent orientation would seem to not be a sufficient condition 
for the emergence of such productions. As Crutchfield (1961) has
9
pointed out, "....analytical perception is sometimes the enemy of 
creative insight. What may be needed is a free, spontaneous 
look at the phenomenon, a childlike apprehension of what is there, 
an attitude of what may be called disciplined naivete." Bloomberg 
(1971) adds:
While creativity involves the task of dissecting 
bits of data and making a conscious, determined effort 
to unravel their meaning, it also involves the task 
of relaxing and letting the whole problem proceed in 
the direction it wants to. There comes a time when 
the problem assumes a momentum of its own and all the 
creative person needs to do is follow the path along 
which the problem takes him. Suppose that the 
individual engages in selective attention very early 
in the creative process. He focuses on the relevant 
items of the problem and discards the irrelevant 
ones prematurely. Considerable damage may be done 
by this maneuver as elements are tossed irretrievably 
offstage that later become essential for a creative 
solution. If, instead, global perception had prevailed 
for a while longer, it might have had a salutary effect 
on the subsequent sorting-out process, and elements 
might have been classified more judiciously. The 
creative person must involve himself with the details 
of the problem for clarifying, classifying, and 
defining, but still obtain detached views of the 
entire problem from time to time for capturing 
attributes of the whole phenomenon that cannot be 
dissected and bringing back into focus elements 
previously sacrificed. The blending together of
these two levels of functioning--involvement and
detachment--is an uncommon event because the merger
depends upon a developmental stage not attained by 
everyone--i.e. hierarchic integration.
What this line of reasoning suggests is that, at its core, 
creative performance consists of both a relatively field-independent 
orientation and a high degree of hierarchic integration of cognitive 
tasks by developmental levels such that the individual is capable 
of cognitive flexibility when appropriate. In order to test this
10
hypothesis, it is necessary to be able to adequately measure both 
attributes. Witkin, et.' al.'s (1971) Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT) 
is a highly reliable, seemingly quite valid measure of field- 
independence (FI). Comalli, Wapner, and Werner (1962) have 
proposed the use of the Stroop Color-Word Test (SCWT) as a measure 
of cognitive flexibility (CF) (and, by inference, hierarchic 
integration). This instrument requires the subject to respond to 
three cards. The first (W) consists of three names of colors 
(red, green and blue) printed in black ink in five columns of 20 
each and arranged in a random fashion with the stipulation that no 
color name appears in succession to itself, on which the subject 
reads the color names as rapidly as possible. The second card (c) 
consists of five columns of three X's, 20 per column, in which the 
subject is asked to name as quickly as possible the color in which 
the X's are printed, their being printed in either red, green or 
blue, with the stipulation that no ink color succeeds itself. The 
third card (CW) consists of the color names of card W printed in 
the ink colors of the correspondingly positioned item on card C, 
with the stipulation that the ink color and the color name are 
never identical, in which the subject must name the ink color in which 
the color name is printed. Performance on card CW is presumed to 
measure, on its face, the effect of competing responses (word 
naming) on the ability to perform the task of color-naming. Since 
color-naming is a developmental predecessor of word reading, the 
Stroop Color-Word Test is a face-valid measure of extent of 
cognitive flexibility, in this case the ability to subordinate
11
the higher-level ability to read words to the lower-level ability 
to name colors. (This notion will be considered in greater detail 
in Chapter II).
Statement of the Problem
Although there exist a number of measures of creativity, many 
problems exist with them. These problems center primarily around 
the mechanics of their administration and scoring, and the extent 
to which they contribute to our understanding of just what 
characteristics and skills lie at the heart of creative productivity. 
The investigator proposes to explore the relationships of the 
variables of field-independence and cognitive flexibility to 
creative test performance with an eye toward developing a more 
valid, reliable and basic measure of creativity. It is hypothesized 
that the Group Embedded Figures Test and the Stroop Color-Word Test, 
in combination, may yield such a measure.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
It shall be the purpose of this chapter to review in detail 
the existing literature relevant to the variables under 
consideration in this study. Specifically, the independent variables 
of field independence and cognitive flexibility (and, by implication, 
hierarchic integration) shall be considered, in order to explicate 
their hypothesized relationship to creativity (or creative test 
performance). This shall be followed by a treatment of the 
concept of creativity in general. Then the literature concerning 
the Stroop Color-Word Test shall be reviewed, since it is an 
experimental instrument, the utility of which is not widely 
recognized. This literature shall then be summarized and the 
formal hypotheses presented.
Field Independence
Werner (1957) proposed what he called the orthogenetic 
principle of development: "...wherever development occurs, it 
proceeds from a state of relative globality and lack of 
differentiation to a state of increasing differentiation, 
articulation, and hierarchic integration". He believed that in 
spite of a multiformity of specific developmental changes that 




An example of this development of increasingly differentiated 
states may be found in the perception of visual stimuli. Witkin, 
et al. (1962) state that as this proceeds, "the self is experienced 
as having definite limits or boundaries. Segregation of the self 
helps make possible greater determination of functioning from 
within, as opposed to a more or less enforced reliance on external 
nurturance and support for maintenance, typical of the relatively 
undifferentiated state". Thereafter, "the person who experiences 
in articulated fashion has the ability to perceive items as 
discrete from their backgrounds, or to reorganize a field, when the 
field is organized, and to impose structure on a field, and so 
perceive it as organized, when the field has relatively little 
inherent structure. In this view the ability to analyze experience 
and the ability to structure experience are both aspects of 
increasing articulation". Their research lead them to conclude 
that "...a field dependent or field-independent way of perceiving 
is one of a large constellation of interrelated characteristics, 
which together reflect an individual's level of differentiation" 
and is a mode that is readily amendable to experimental investigation 
using the Embedded Figures Tests, which they "have used to define 
the field-dependence dimension, which in turn, (serves) as a 
'tracer element' in identifying level of psychological 
differentiation more generally".
A logical extension of this notion is whether individual 
differences in the area of perception might have their counterpart
14
in intellectual functioning. "Intellectual problems that call for a 
high degree of creative activity, but do not involve perception 
directly, often also require that 'parts' be separated from the 
context in which they are embedded and brought into new relationships. 
It is likely that if a person has this basic ability to 'break up' a 
configuration, it will be manifested not only in straightforward 
perceptual situations but in problem-solving situations as well." 
(Witkin, et al. 1954).
Two major methods have been employed in attempting to determine 
the relationship between perceptual field-independence (and, by 
implication, psychological differentiation in general) and 
creativity. The first of these methods is to determine personality 
traits that field independent and creative persons share. Bloomberg 
(1967) has summarized this research, pointing to six such 
personality traits. These are summarized in Table 1.
TABLE 1
STUDIES FINDING SIMILAR TRAITS IN FIELD - 





Low Conformity Linton (1955) Barron (1963)
Risk-taking Kogan & Wallach (1964) Mackworth (1965)
Taylor & Holland 
(1964)
Relative lack of 
repression
Witkin (1965) Myden (1959)
15





High level of Witkin, et al. (1962) Mendelsohn &
incidental learning Griswold (1964)
Permissive parents Dyk & Witkin (1965) Getzels & 
Jackson (1962)
Low identification 
with mother among 
males
Vaught (1965) Garwood (1964)
In addition, Witkin et al. (1962) cite research suggesting that 
Thurstone's concept of "flexibility of closure" in the perception of 
visual stimuli, identified in his factor-analytic study of perception 
(Thurstone, 1944) and employed also by Podell and Phillips (1959) to 
describe a cluster emerging in their factor-analytic study, is 
synonymous with their concept of field-independence. Adcock and 
Martin (1971) found a high correlation between flexibility of 
closure and high creativity-test scores.
The characterization that emerges is that of the field-independent 
and the creative person as both being highly individualistic, 
relatively unconstrained by external influences, open to new 
experiences and modes of perception, and more attentive to the 
totality of their environments and themselves.
The second method used to attempt to determine the relationship 
between perceptual field-independence and creativity is to directly
16
correlate scores obtained on instruments presumed to measure both 
traits. On this score, the track record to date is decidedly mixed. 
The following studies are suggestive of the existing state of 
confusion:
Spotts and Mackler (1967) divided 45 subjects into 3 groups of 
equal size and labelled them field-independent, field-central, and 
field-dependent; subjects were matched for I.Q. as measured by the 
Gamma Form of the Otis Quick-Scoring Mental Abilities Test (Otis, 
1954). The criterion measures of level of psychological 
differentiation were the Jackson Short Form of the Witkin Embedded 
Figures Test (Jackson, 1956), and the Hidden Figures Test (Jackson, 
et al. 1962). All subjects were then administered 4 tests of 
creative thinking abilities, 2 verbal ("Ask and Guess", "Tin Cans": 
Torrance, 1962) and 2 non-verbal ("Circles": Torrance, 1962; 
"Decorations": Guilford and Merrifield, 1960). These 4 tests 
yielded a total of 14 subscores. The 14 mean scores for each of the 
3 groups were then ranked and Kendall's coefficient of concordance 
(W) was computed. The field-independent group performed most 
creatively, followed by the field-dependent and field-central groups, 
(W=.40, S=156.5, p=.01). They offer no explanation why the field- 
central group performed least creatively. However, when the same 
experimental design was employed with 114 subjects (from whom the 
45 subjects for the previous study were drawn), unmatched for Otis IQ, 
the most creative group was the field-independent, followed by the 
field-central and field-dependent groups (W=.75, S=294, p=.01).
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Gensemer (1967) administered the Hidden Figures Test (HFT), a 
"Field Dependency Index" (consisting of the Picture Completion and 
Block Design subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale), and 
the Minnesota Tests of Creativity (forerunners of the Torrance Tests 
of Creative Thinking) to 66 college seniors majoring in education. 
While he found no significant main effect, the trend of his data led 
him to conclude that "a field-independent mode of perception does 
provide more favorable conditions for creative thinking."
McWhinnie (1967) administered the Embedded Figures Test (EFT) 
and the figural (non-verbal) tasks of the Torrance Tests of Creative 
Thinking (TTCT) to 136 6th grade public school students in Newhall, 
California. He found a significant correlation between EFT and TTCT 
figural originality scores (r=.23, p <.02), as well as between EFT 
and figural elaboration scores (r=.22, p<.02). No significant 
correlations were found for EFT and figural fluency or flexibility 
scores. However, even the significant correlations that were 
observed were of a relatively low magnitude.
Stevens (1969) employed as subjects 134 7th grade students in 
Georgia public schools and administered the short form of the EFT and 
the Torrance tests. Three correlations were significant at or below 
the .05 level: field-dependence and verbal flexibility: -.31; 
field-dependence and verbal originality: -.30; field-dependence and 
figural elaboration: -.31. He concluded, incorrectly, that this 
provided "limited evidence for a direct relationship" between field- 
independence and creative test performance, the directness of the 
relationship being, of course, the major point open to dispute.
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Baker (1970) administered the EFT short form to 85 Washington 
University graduate students from 5 departments and correlated those 
scores with the results of "Creativity Rating Forms" completed by 
the students' major professors. Although no significant relationship 
was found for the overall sample, one was found for engineering students 
and a trend toward one was found for business administration students. 
(Magnitudes were unspecified).
Ohnmacht and McMorris (1971), in exploring the relationships of 
field-independence and dogmatism to creative performance, administered 
the Hidden Figures Test and Remote Associates Test (Mednick 1967) to 
74 subjects; they observed significant main effects for neither 
independent variable. However, the interaction approached significance 
(F=2.86, df=l,36, p <.l). Their conclusion was that neither variable 
was useful singly in explaining variation on a task presumed to 
reflect creative potential but that in combination predictive power 
was enhanced somewhat.
Bloomberg (1971) administered that Rod and Frame Test (RFT) to 60 
male undergraduates at the University of Michigan to assess degree 
of field-independence, as well as 3 measures of creative ability: 
the Revised Art Scale, part of the Welsh Figure Preference Test (Welsh, 
1959), the Similes Preference Inventory (Pearson and Maddi, 1966), 
and the Creative Personality Scale (Fricke, 1963). Intercorrelations 
among the three creativity measures ranged from .11 to .22; the 
raw scores were converted to standard (Z) scores and were added for 
each subject, on the assumption that, since each test had previously 
been shown to distinguish creative from non-creative subjects, the 
measures, tapping relatively unrelated components of creative thinking,
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would continue to do so when added together. A median split on the 
basis of composite creativity scores was performed, to distinguish 
creatives from non-creatives. A median split was then performed on 
the non-creative group on the basis of RFT scores, on the dubious 
assumption that non-creatives are as likely to be field-independent 
as field-dependent. If this were true, Bloomberg reasoned, and all 
creatives were field-independent, then all creatives should have an 
RFT below the median score of the non-creative group (that is, be 
more field-independent). Thus, the non-creatives median RFT score 
was used to define field-independence vs. dependence in the creative 
group. However, he observed no significant difference between the 
number of field-independent and field-dependent subjects in the 
creative subgroup, and concluded on this basis that creativity is not 
contingent upon field-independence. It would seem, however, that 
Bloomberg's logic in operationalizing field-independence and 
creativity is so strained that his study must be regarded as being 
fraught with deficiencies and of little utility.
Cognitive Flexibility
The concept of cognitive flexibility, by whatever name, has a 
long history in psychological literature. Its origins may be traced 
back at least as far as Freud (1911), who drew a distinction between 
what he called primary and secondary process, the former being 
thought of as primitive, non-logical, diffuse in nature, with no 
differentiation between self and external world, and governed by the 
attainment of pleasure, and the latter being structured, logical thought,
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with a high level of differentiation between self and reality, and 
governed by an attempt to achieve a concordance between the desires 
of the organism and the demands of reality. Freud noted that 
individuals never really renounce primary process functioning; they 
merely attempt to reconcile it with reality. It is of interest that 
he particularly saw evidence of this oscillation in artists, in 
whom he believed it to be an integral part of their propensity toward 
creative output.
Kris (1952), in exploring the cognitive functioning of artists, 
spoke of the ability of the ego to exert control over the process of 
regression and particularly its capacity of control over the primary 
process. This "shift of psychic levels", he felt, lied at the heart 
of creative productivity. The distinction between creativity and 
psychosis was this: in the former, "the ego controls the primary 
process and puts it into its service"; in the latter, "the ego is 
overwhelmed by the primary process". Thus arises the concept of 
"regression in the service of the ego".
Rapaport (1951) refers to Werner's (1948) concept of "physiog­
nomic" perception, in which the quality of an object is experienced 
prior to any details, that is, a state in which imaging and 
perceiving are not definitely separated, and calls this a "mobile 
cathexis of ideational representation", which he believes underlies 
the primary process. He speaks of:
"the 'inventive' phase of creative thinking, which abides 
by the rules of the primary process. The idea... arising 
in consciousness may take various forms--a vague, general 
'feel', a sense of relationship, a schematic pattern, a 
verbal or visual fragment, and so on. In any case, it is 
characterized by a paucity of relationships, and turns the
I
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iodosyncratic 'inventive' product of the individual into
the social communication of art or science....
The elaborative phase, in contrast to the inventive, 
is effortful and operates by the rules of the 
secondary process."
Werner (1957) elaborates upon the relationship of a flexible 
mode of functioning to creative productivity: . . an organism,
having attained highly stabilized structures and operations, may 
or may not progress further, but if it does, this will be 
accomplished through partial return to a genetically earlier, less 
stable level . . . .  One has to regress in order to progress."
This he calls "the flexibility of a person to operate at different 
levels depending on the requirements of the situation." He adds:
This aspect of flexibility is connected with a . . .
problem of individuality, namely that of creativity. Now 
creativity, in its most general meaning, is an essential 
feature of emergent evolution, and this, in turn, implies 
progression through reorganization. Since we assume that 
such progress through reorganization cannot be achieved 
without "starting anew", that is, without regression, it 
follows that a person's capacity for creativity 
presupposes mobility in terms of regression and 
progression. The hypothesis would be then that the more 
creative the person, the wider his range of operations 
in terms of developmental levels, or in other words, the 
greater his capacity to utilize primitive as well as 
advanced operations.
Myden (1956) was one of the first individuals to attempt an 
experimental investigation of these hypotheses. Twenty "recognized 
creatively productive individuals" in the fields of painting, 
writing, and choreography were contrasted with twenty "eminently 
successful industrialists and professional individuals" on the basis
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of Thematic Apperception Test, Rorschach, Bender-Gestalt, Vigotsky 
Concept Formation Test and Human Figures Drawings Test performance; 
subjects were equated for age, sex, and socioeconomic status. The 
creative subjects were reported to display "significantly greater 
amounts of primary thought process" in their performance and to 
not manifest anxiety in connection with this, presumably 
demonstrating their ability to control the use of the primary 
process. Myden concludes that "the key characteristics (of the 
creative subjects) appear to consist of a personality constellation 
in which primary thought process is not repressed but is integrated 
with secondary or intellectualized thought processes".
Pine and Holt (1960) employed the Rorschach Test as a measure 
of amount of expression of and degree of control over the primary 
process (using a scoring system described by Holt, 1959 and Holt 
and Havel, 1960), as well as seven instruments designed to assess 
creative ability. They found almost complete statistical indepen­
dence between the amount of primary process expression and the 
ability to control such expression (Spearman's rho = .01 for males,
N = 13: non-significant; rho = .25 for females, N = 14: non­
significant). As expected, they found, however, significant 
correlations between the ability to control primary process 
expression and the quality of creative productions (rho = .80 for 
males, p<.01; rho = .52 for females, p<.05), lending support 
to their hypothesis that the degree of flexibility of a person to 
operate at different developmental levels, according to the 
requirements of the situation, and the extent of a person's creative
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ability are related traits.
Hersch (1962) hypothesized that not only would creative subjects 
show a more ready availability of both developmentally mature and 
primitive responses to Rorschach stimuli than non-creators, but that 
there would be reliable differences between the responses of 
creative and schizophrenic subjects as well, in response to the oft- 
levelled criticism of operationalizing creativity strictly in terms 
of frequency of novel productions. Sixty subjects, all male adults 
equated for age, intellectual ability and Rorschach response 
productivity, were employed; 20 were individuals who had "achieved 
prominence as a creator in one of the major cultural domains," 20 
were non-pathological individuals who were in no way distinguished 
for their creative abilities and 20 were hospitalized schizophrenics. 
Rorschach responses were scored by means of the Genetic Scoring 
System (Phillips, Kaden, and Waldman, 1959), in which responses are 
scored as relatively mature or primitive on the basis of the formal 
properties of differentiation, articulation, and integration vs. 
diffuseness and syncretism, as outlined by Werner (1948, 1957).
Six response categories were used: movement, integrative, form 
dominant, form subordinate, physiognomic, and primitive thought 
responses, the first three being considered mature, the latter three 
being considered primitive. The artists gave significantly more 
responses than the normals in two of the three mature response 
categories (M, FD) and two of the three primitive categories (P, PT). 
They gave significantly more mature responses than the schizo­
phrenic subjects in all three categories; of the three primitive
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response categories, only the physiognomic category significantly 
discriminated between the two groups. Hersch notes that physiognomic 
Rorschach responses are, in fact, quite rate among schizophrenics 
(and children as well) and speculates that this points to a 
fundamental difference between the primitive functioning of 
schizophrenics and creators: in schizophrenics, the subject-object 
fusion of physiognomic perception is given the status of objective 
reality and is acted upon; creators, on the other hand, after 
perceiving physiognomically, are "able to reflect upon the experience, 
objectify it, and distinguish between what is within himself and what 
is valid for the external stimulus. Such a second step implies 
self-environment differentiation", as Werner's theory suggests 
should be the case.
Wild (1965) employed 30 students at Yale University's professional 
art school as creative subjects and compared them with 26 graduate 
students in education and 26 hospitalized schizophrenics in terms of 
performance on the Word Association (WA) and Object Sorting (OS) 
tests (Rapaport, Gill, and Schafer, 1945, 1946) under three 
conditions: spontaneous performance, as a highly regulated,
conventional person in a character sketch read to them might perform, 
and as a highly unregulated, whimsical person in a character sketch 
read to them might perform, her hypothesis being that ability to 
shift from performance under one set of instructions to another 
"involves both a capacity to engage in unregulated thinking and an 
ability to return adaptively to more regulated thought, implying 
some degree of control of regression." Subjects were matched for
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age, sex, and intelligence. Responses were classified as either 
conventional or original according to Rapaport's norms. Group 
differences for originality under the spontaneous condition were 
significant for both the WA (p C.025) and OS (p<.05) tests, with 
the creative subjects (art students) being the most original, 
followed by the normals and then the schizophrenics. Group differ­
ences for shift scores were also significant for both the WA and OS 
tests (p <.025), with the creative subjects exhibiting the greatest 
shift, followed by the normals and then the schizophrenics. Follow-up 
questionnaires also disclosed that the creative subjects were 
significantly more likely to prefer operating in the unregulated 
mode than these in the other two groups (p<.005).
Gamble and Kellner (1968), following the lead of Wapner (1964), 
employed the Stroop Color-Word Test as a measure of ability to 
perform a developmentally more primitive task while subordinating more 
mature functioning. A total of 130 individuals were administered the 
Remote Associates Test (RAT); from that pool, 26 high-creative and 
26 low-creative subjects were selected (those falling one standard 
deviation above and below the mean RAT score). The effects of 
intelligence, scholastic aptitude, and speed-reading ability were 
controlled. An analysis of covariance revealed that the high 
creative group performed significantly faster on card CW of the 
SCWT, i.e., that card assessing primitive functioning, than the low 
creative group (p<.05); adjusted group means on card CW were as 
follows: high-creative group: 81.3 seconds, low-creative group:
120 seconds. Further, an assessment of perceptual vs. conceptual
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dominance of cognitive style (to be discussed later) failed to 
reveal even marginally significant differences between the two 
groups, suggesting that the two groups did not substantially differ 
on the relative strengths of the two cognitive subsystems; the authors 
interpret these results as evidence for greater cognitive flexibility 
among the high-creative subjects.
Bloomberg (1971) attempted to determine the relationship between 
cognitive flexibility and creativity by having 60 male undergraduates 
at the University of Michigan perform Necker cube reversals under 
two conditions (passive instructions; instructions to reverse as 
rapidly and frequently as possible), and performed an analysis of 
variance with a battery of creativity measures. Bloomberg glibly 
states his belief that subtracting passive reversal rate from 
induced rapid reversal rate yields "a yard stick of the ability to 
shift between global and analytic modes of functioning", but provides 
no explanation or theoretical formulation underlying this belief.
He found no significant differences between the groups he labeled 
"mobile" (flexible) and "rigid" on the basis of frequency of 
Necker cube reversal in terms of their performance on the battery 
of creativity measures.
Bloomberg (1969), although unconcerned with creative ability, 
employed a median split on the basis of Embedded Figures Test scores 
to divide 24 female aid 14 male subjects into field-independent and 
field-dependent groups, and then administered the SCWT to determine 
if the groups differed on level on cognitive flexibility. Although 
group differences were found for the females, in the predicted
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direction of FI subjects having faster card CW reading times, they were 
not significant. Group differences for the males were slight, non­
significant, and in the opposite of the predicted direction. However, 
as Bloomberg failed to control for card W and card C differences on 
the SCWT (an issue to be discussed later), employed a median split to 
dichotomize all subjects as either FI or FD, which tends to mask real 
group differences, and employed rather small n's, conclusions drawn 
from the results of his study should perhaps be taken only lightly.
In fact, Huckabee and McGown (1971), in an attempted replication 
employing the same faculty methodology, failed to find even the 
suggestive trends noted by Bloomberg.
Botkin (1973), although also unconcerned with creative ability, 
attempted to determine the relationship between "fixity-mobility" 
(rigidity vs. flexibility) and field-independence. She, however, 
concerned herself with two types of flexibility: perceptual and 
cognitive. The former she assessed by employing modifications of 
the Body Adjustment and Rod and Frame tests (the modifications being 
unspecified), the latter by the Word Association and Object Sorting 
tests under the three conditions successfully employed by Wild 
(1965) and previously mentioned. Subjects were 43 male under­
graduates identified as "field-independent" on the basis of an 
unspecified measure. Although both cognitive measures were 
significantly correlated with one another, as were both perceptual 
measures, no one cognitive measure was significantly correlated 
with one perceptual measure. Further, Botkin found no linear 
relationships between extent of field-independence and degree of
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cognitive or perceptual flexibility. These results tend to support 
the hypothesis that field-independent perc.eivers may or may not 
exhibit cognitive flexibility; thus the former does not necessarily 
imply the latter.
Creativity
A treatment of the concept of creativity, in order to clarify 
rather than obfuscate, should perhaps begin with a drawing of dis­
tinctions. Anderson and Cropley (1966) distinguish between the 
notions of originality and creativity. The former, they claim, 
need only be defined in terms of the statistical infrequency of a 
response; for the response to be labelled "creative", a value 
judgment is necessitated in which the response is required to meet 
the aesthetic or professional criteria established by the label- 
wielder. Thus, they might fault the defintion of creativity put 
forth by Rogers (1962) as "the emergency in action of a novel 
relational product, growing out of the uniqueness of the individual 
on the one hand, and the materials, events, people, or circumstances 
of his life on the other." They make the further claim that many 
existing "creativity" tests are in actuality nothing more than 
measures of originality. It is to this issue that Jackson and 
Messick (1965) speak when they note that the unusualness of a 
response can be only a first step in the definition of creativity. 
Therefore, they add the criterion of appropriateness, that is, the 
response must fit its context and make sense in light of the demands 
of the situation, both internally (when the products are complex) 
and externally. As the criterion of appropriateness does little to
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distinguish between creativity and intelligence, however, they state 
their belief that creative production also entails the transformation 
of materials or ideas in order to overcome conventional restraints, 
as well as condensation of materials or ideas, such that the product 
yields more information with repeated examination and contemplation.
A second distinction that should be drawn has been noted by 
Nicholls (1972): whether one conceives of creativity as a unitary 
trait or as a term which describes a combination of other traits.
Those who assume that creativity is a unitary (and normally 
distributed) trait generally adopt as their research methodology an 
examination of the psychological significance of the trait and the 
nature of its contribution to creative production. Nicholls argues 
that in order to assume a normally-distributed single trait, one must 
isolate the distinctive characteristics of eminent creators and 
demonstrate a positive relationship among those characteristics and 
creative production in unselected samples. But in reviewing the 
evidence amassed by researchers employing this methodology, Nicholls 
forcefully argues that the characteristics most commonly identified, 
namely a propensity toward divergent thinking, generally high 
intelligence, a high level of intrinsic task-involvement, and a 
preference for complexity and disorder, bear no systematic 
relationships to unselected samples. Thus it is that Nicholls advises 
the adoption of a products-oriented approach to the examination of 
what is called creativity, in which products are rated on a 
continuum of creativity and the personal and social factors
associated with creative achievements are examined.
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Guilford (1971), too, argues against conceiving of creativity in 
terms of a single ability: he points out that his own factor- 
analytic studies (e.g. Guilford and Hoepfner, 1966; Guilford, 1967) 
have been interpreted as demonstrating that even such traits as 
propensity toward divergent thinking and intelligence, characteristic 
of eminent creators, are not unitary; rather they load on a variety 
of types of verbal and figural cognitions derived from his structure- 
of-intellect model (Guilford, 1956, 1957, 1967). Like Nicholls, 
Guilford believes that creativity is best conceived of as a 
combination of abilities or traits.
Khatena (1971), echoes the sentiments of those arguing against 
conceiving of creativity as a unitary trait and in favor of a multi­
dimensional approach, and then inadvertently illustrates the 
pervasiveness of the problem by using the term "divergent thinking" 
synonymously with "creativity".
Treffinger, Renzulli, and Feldhusen (1971), note that the failure 
of past investigators to recognize the multidimensionality of the 
creative process has led them to ignore affective and motivational 
influences on creative performance. It should be evident that 
individuals do not enter the testing situation with identical degrees 
of interest and motivation.
Yamamoto (1965) summarizes the conceptual problem associated with 
the study of creativity by distinguishing four types of philosophical 
orientations that researchers have implicitly or explicitly adopted:
a. non-positivistic holism: the belief that "analytical 
studies of creativity are simply impossible without
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destroying the essence of the act of creation."
b. positivistic holism: the belief that, while empirical 
investigation is possible, reductionistic approaches 
are inappropriate; it is necessary to understand a 
person's creative behavior in its whole.
c. non-positivistic elementarism: the belief of those 
who "enthusiastically declare their faith in the 
universal creative potential of man and exhort 
others to follow certain procedures to foster 
creativity, basing their arguments on largely intuitive 
judgment and casual (i.e. uncontrolled) observations."
d. positivistic elementarism: the belief of "those who 
contend that reductionistic empiricism is the royal 
road to the understanding of creative behavior."
As "each group has its unique assumptions, adopts its particular 
definitions, and employs its preferred techniques of inquiry,"
Yamamoto likens them to blind men among the proverbial elephant.
However, the emerging consensus appears to be that, while 
reductionistic empiricism may not be the royal road to understanding 
creativity, creative behavior is not a single elephant; rather, it 
is composed of several elephants ranging through the jungle in the 
company of one another, and some form of reductionistic empiricism 
may be the least unsatisfactory method of studying them.
Guilford and his colleagues (Guilford, et. al,, 1960; Wilson, Guilford 
Christensen, and Lewis, 1954; Berger, Guilford and Christensen, 1957; 
Guilford, Christensen, Frick, and Merrifield, 1957) have attempted
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to determine what primary traits and related non-aptitude traits are 
related to creative productivity. Their factor-analytic studies, 
involving in the main 53 tests administered to 410 air cadets and 
student officers, resulted in the following factors (and ways of 
measuring them):
a. word fluency: the ability to produce words to 
specification (e.g. words beginning with 'a' and 
ending with 'f1)
b. associational fluency: the ability to produce 
synonyms
c. expressional fluency: the production of phrases 
and sentences according to stated grammatical 
requirements
d. ideational fluency: the production of ideas that 
fit specified requirements (e.g. uses for a common 
brick)
e. spontaneous flexibility: the production of a great 
variety of ideas without inertia
f. adaptive flexibility: the ability to reject con­
ventional but inappropriate solutions in favor of 
novel ones
g. originality: the production of statistically in­
frequent responses
h. redefinition: the ability to give up old interpret­
ations of familiar objects in order to use them or
their parts in new ways
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i. elaboration: the ability to build upon a simple 
s timulus.
In addition, they implicate the following non-aptitude (i.e. 
motiviational and temperamental) traits:
a. perseverence
b. tolerance for stimulus ambiguity
c. liking for convergent thinking
d. liking for divergent thinking
What has remained unclear is the extent to which high intelligence 
is a necessary condition for creative productivity. One of the most 
extensive treatments of this issue is provided by Getzels and 
Jackson (1962), who claim that the two are independent in the sense 
that high intelligence, as conventionally measured, does not imply 
high creativity, or vice versa. In fact, conventional IQ measures 
require that the subject "know the common association to a stimulus 
and the accepted solution to a problem-" Measures of creative 
abilities, on the other hand, seek novel and speculative solutions 
to problems. The retort of Nicholls (1972) is that, while this may 
be true, "no one would suggest that individuals with IQ's of 70 are 
generally as likely to make significant creative achievements as 
individuals with IQ's of 130."
Wallach and Kogan (1965a) also examined this issue in their' 
administration of 10 creativity and 10 intelligence tests to 151 
school-age children. While the average correlation among creativity 
measures was .4 and the average correlation among intelligence measures 
was .5, the average correlation between the two was .1. On this
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basis, they conclude that they are separate dimensions, or at least 
can be separated when the testing takes place in the kind of relaxed, 
play-like atmosphere they provided their subjects. Cronbach (1968) 
posits a more conservative conclusion in his reanalysis of the 
Wallach and Kogan data: he believes that the intelligence measures 
employed are more aptly referred to as achievement measures, and 
the creative performance instruments more aptly referred to as 
measures of flexibility and fluency of responses in an open-ended 
situation, making the appearance of independence more readily 
explainable. This issue is further complicated by Nicholls' (1971) 
demonstration that game-like vs. test-like administration may account 
for considerable variance in divergent-thinking abilities as well. 
Thus, it would seem advisable to consider the effects of intelligence 
and testing procedures on creative performance in future research.
Are there sex differences in the quality or frequency of 
creative behavior? Kogan (1974) has ably summarized the existing 
literature on this topic and concludes that there are not. Although 
one must bear in mind that some investigators employ loose 
definitions of creativity (e.g. "divergent thinking", "originality"), 
while others employ restrictive definitions (e.g. Nicholls, 1972), 
and that there are almost as many measures of creativity as there 
are psychologists studying it, published studies to date indicate 
no clear trend in favor of any one sex. Some (e.g. Torrance, 1962; 
Hudson, 1968) have found superior male performance, some have found 
superior female performance (e.g. Guilford, 1967; Wallach and Wing, 
1969), and some have found no differences (e.g. Torrance, 1965,
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Wallach and Kogan, 1965b, Feldhusen and Denny, 1965; Klausmeir and 
Wiersma, 1965). Moreover, the inability to separate the effects of 
genetic sex from the differential cultural influences on the two 
sexes would make any emergent trend almost uninterpretable. Thus, 
Kogan's conclusion of a lack of sex differences in creative ability 
is perhaps the safest conclusion to draw.
Where clear sex differences have emerged, and this perhaps 
underscores the necessity of considering cultural influences, is in 
examining the situational variables attendant in the testing 
situation. Kogan and Pankove (1972) tested a group of fifth grade 
students individually with a battery of creativity measures used by 
Wallach and Kogan (1965a,b). The same subjects were tested five 
years later, with half being retested individually and half being 
retested in groups. For males, the correlations between the two 
administrations was quite high (approximately .50), irrespective of 
type of administration. For females tested individually both times, 
the correlation was approximately the same. However, for females 
retested in groups, the correlation was near zero. Since individual 
testing was done by a supportive same-sexed examiner, it is difficult 
to separate the effects of supportiveness from those of a one-on-one 
relationship with a same-sexed examiner. However, the work of Gall 
and Mendelsohn (1967) and Mendelsohn and Gall (1970), appear to 
clarify this. The first study found a pronounced interaction between 
sex of subject and sex of examiner for females but not for males, 
with a female examiner resulting in facilitation of performance.
In the subsequent study, the authors found no personality differences
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for males who were or were not benefitted by training sessions in 
creative performance. For females, no personality differences were 
observed when the examiner was female. However, when the examiner 
was male, the females were more likely to describe themselves as 
moody, reserved, tense, touchy and withdrawn on the Adjective Check 
List. Taken in sum, these studies strongly suggest that contextual 
variables play a significant role in creative performance among 
females: they perform better when tested individually by a female.
What, then, is creativity? It may perhaps be most adequately 
described as a constellation of traits (rather than a single trait) 
that result in productions that have the characteristics of novelty, 
value, and unconventionality, and which result in a reformulation 
of vagueness in the original stimuli. Further, they proceed out 
of persistence and high motivation on the part of the creator 
(Newell, Shaw & Simon, 1962). Torrance (1974) offers the following 
definition:
" . . .  a process of becoming sensitive to problems, 
deficiencies, gaps in knowledge, missing elements, 
disharmonies, and so on; identifying the 
difficulty; searching for solutions, making guesses, 
or formulating hypotheses about the deficiencies; 
testing and retesting these hypotheses and possibly 
modifying and retesting them; and finally communi­
cating the results."
It is the contention of this author, however, that these 
specific abilities may be subsumed under (and, in fact, proceed 
out of) the cognitive variables known as level of psychological 
differentiation and degree of cognitive flexibility. It would be
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futile, however, to claim that any of these specific abilities may 
be attributed to one or the other of the independent variables under 
consideration, for it lies at the heart of Werner's theory to 
suppose that creative behavior proceeds out of their working in 
combination, given certain non-aptitude traits such as high 
motiva tion.
Stroop Color-Word Test
Predecessors of the Stroop Color-Word Test date back at least 
to 1883, when James McKeen Cattell began his doctoral research 
under Wilhelm Wundt at Leipzig on the time required to name colors 
and objects and their corresponding words (Jensen and Rohwer, 1966). 
He published the first experimental study of the relative speeds of 
color-naming and color-word reading in Mind three years later 
(Cattell, 1886). The phenomenon of color-word interference was 
later investigated by Descoeudres (1914), Brown (1915), and Jaensch 
(1929), among others. The current form of the color-word test was 
introduced into American psychology by Stroop (1935), however, and 
has remained relatively unchanged since. Stroop's version employed 
three cards, with five colors and color words arranged in a 10 x 10 
matrix; most current versions use three cards, three colors (red, 
green and blue), and a 5 x 20 arrangement.
The Stroop Color-Word Test may be scored in no less than 16 
ways (Jensen & Rohwer, 1966), some of which result in scores which 
are merely linear transformations of other scores. The most commonly 
used scores are a) the basic scores, consisting of raw reading times
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for each of the 3 (W, C, CW) cards, b) the derived interference 
scores, obtained by subtracting the observed C score from the 
observed CW, or subtracting the predicted CW score, based on a 
regression of CW on C, from the observed CW. The pattern that 
emerges is invariably the same, however: word-reading (W) is quite 
rapid, color-naming (C) is somewhat slower, and color-word naming (CW) 
is considerably slower. Further, these differences in reading and 
naming times are remarkably reliable across repeated administrations, 
in spite of a known practice effect for the first two or three trials. 
(See Figure 1) For example, Jensen (1965a), using 436 subjects 
and 10 administrations, reported composite estimates of reliability for 
the three basic scores ranging from .89 to .98. His estimates of 
reliabilities for a single administration,known to be the most 
unreliable, are W: r=.88, C: r=.79, and CW: r=.71.
Considerable controversy has attended the attempts of Stroop 
investigators to explain the nature of color-word interference.
The fundamental dichotomy centers around explanations in terms of 
stimulus competition vs. response competition. Stimulus - 
competition explanations (e.g. Hochman, 1971) are largely discounted 
today, owing to a multitude of studies (e.g. Gardner, Jackson &
Messick, 1960; Gardner & Moriarty, 1968, Dalrymple-Alford &
Azkoul, 1972) demonstrating a lack of firm relationships between 
Stroop performance and performance on other measures shown to measure 
ability to screen irrelevant stimuli. On the other hand, a number of 
studies with the Stroop and various analogues of the Stroop, intricately 
summarized by Dyer (1973), have lent considerable support to
FIGURE 1 MEAN TIME FOR EACH STROOP CARD AS A FUNCTION OF NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATIONS
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explanations centering around competition from dominant but 
inappropriate responses.
Perhaps the first individual to suggest that the Stroop Color- 
Word Test might be suitable for investigating the variable that has 
come to be known as cognitive flexibility was Klein (1954). He 
operationalized the dimension of constricted vs. flexible cognitive 
control on the basis of Stroop performance, in fact, and noted the 
differing modes of coping with stimuli containing contradictory or 
intrusive cues on this and other tasks.
Constricted control subjects resort to counteractive 
measures in their attempts to overcome the disruptive 
effects of intrusive cues. When possible, their re­
sponses were guided by the most central or obvious 
aspect of a field; i.e., they coped with distracting 
stimuli by ignoring them in favor of a salient, easily 
confirmable stimulus attribute. When external cues 
seemed to contradict internal ones, the conflict was 
resolved in favor of the most obvious external ones.
These subjects tended to avoid using feelings or 
emotional reactions as a source of information.
Constricted-control subjects also seemed resistive to 
change, preferring to maintain sets long after they 
were appropriate, another indication that they could 
not take advantage of all available cues.
Flexible-control subjects seemed relatively comfortable 
in situations that involved contradictory or intrusive 
cues. They were not overimpressed with a dominant 
stimulus organization if the instructions rendered 
another part of the field more appropriate. Thus, 
they were capable of differential response to 
specified aspects of a field in the face of explicitly 
interferring cues. In addition, their responses to a 
personal inventory suggested that they did not tend to 
suppress feeling and other internal cues. (Gardner,
Holzman, Klein, Linton, & Spence, 1959)
Holt (1960) separated subjects into high - and low - interference 
groups on the basis of Stroop performance and scored their Rorschach
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responses for expression of and control over primary process 
manifestations, using the scoring procedure discussed earlier. He 
found that low - interferences subjects (i.e. those exhibiting 
greater flexibility) exhibited a greater proportion of primary 
process thought (p<.l) and their primary process manifestations 
tended to be of what he called the Level I (more blatant and 
directly drive-related) rather than the Level II (more toned-down, 
derivative, and socially-acceptable) type ( p = .05). He also 
noted that high-interference subjects exhibited more signs of 
tension, e.g., squirming, sighing, nervous laughing, than low- 
interference subjects while taking the Rorschach, suggesting 
greater discomfort in dealing with their primary process thought.
In the first real use of the Stroop in a test of Werner's 
theory concerning the nature of the developmental process, Comalli, 
Wapner, & Werner (1962) administered the SCWT to 253 subjects ranging 
in age from several to 80 years. The number of subjects in each age 
group is listed in Table 2.
TABLE 2
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN EACH AGE GROUP IN COMALLI,
WAPNER, & WERNER'S (1962) STUDY
Age 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 17-19 25-34 35-44 65-80
No. of
Sub- 24 20 20 25 29 25 29
jects
18 14 16 15
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Comalli, et al. predicted that younger subjects would show less 
differentiation and hierarchic integration (i.e. cognitive flexi­
bility) than those in the middle range, and hence greater 
interference, and that, since, in their view, old age is 
characterized by regression and dedifferentiation, less adequate 
Stroop performance would re-emerge later in life. Their results are 
presented in Figure 2.
The obtained results conform to the predicted results. Further, 
an analysis of variance determined that the main effects for age 
and card, as well as the interaction of age x card, were significant 
at the level of p< .01. It is of interest to note that these 
results make virtually untenable the original explanation offered by 
Stroop (1935) for color-word interference in terms of more frequent 
practice in reading words than in naming colors.
Wapner and Krus (1960) speculated that schizophrenia also is 
characterized by regression and dedifferentiation, and hence a 
lesser degree of cognitive flexibility, and that the same process 
occurs when the psychotomimetic drug lysergic acid diethylamide 
(LSD-25) is administered; their comparisons of SCWT performance 
for schizophrenics vs. normals and LSD-25 vs. placebo subjects 
determined that this is indeed the case.
Rand, Wapner, Werner, and McFarland (1963) employed a novel 
approach in their study of developmental trends in SCWT performance: 
they recorded individual responses to each stimulus in order to 
determine the frequencies of deviant responses to the items (e.g. 












FIGURE 2 CHANGES IN PERFORMANCE ON THE STROOP COLOR-WORD TEST AS A FUNCTION OF AGE
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inarticulate utterances) and deviant responses to the sequences of 
items (e.g. insertion of words, omissions, inserted linguistic and 
non-linquistic utterances); their subjects consisted of 40 youths,
10 each in the age groups of 6-7, 9-10, 12-13, and 16-17. Although 
their specific results are somewhat beyond the scope of this study, 
it bears noting that certain predictable trends in deviant responses 
occur as age level increases: five response categories show a 
general decrease in frequency, one shows an increase, and one shows 
a decrease followed by an increase. Rand, et al. interpret these 
results as indicating further the usefulness of the SCWT in 
assessing developmental changes in cognitive functioning, a 
sentiment echoed by Wapner (1964) in a lengthy restatement of 
Werner's organismic-developmental approach to cognition.
Sack and Rice (1974) factor-analyzed the performance of 164 
8th-grade students on a battery of attentional measures, including 
the SCWT. They identified three oblique (but lowly-correlated) 
factors: selectivity (the capacity to attend selectively to
relevant cues),resistance to distraction (distraction being defined 
as an involuntary change in an established attentional focus), and 
shifting (voluntarily changing an established attentional focus). 
Some (e.g. Houston, 1969) have interpreted low Stroop interference 
scores as indicative of ability to resist distraction. However, in 
this study, Stroop performance loaded negatively (-.181) on the 
resistance-to-distraction factor: it loaded .726 on the shifting 
factor and .576 on the selectivity factor, however, as would be 
predicted from the model and explanations under consideration.
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As might be expected, the measures which loaded most highly on 
the selectivity factor were measures of perceptual field independence 
(the Group Embedded Figures and the Hidden Figures Tests). This 
raises the issue of the extent to which the SCWT is a measure Of 
field-independence as well. From the standpoint of Werner's theory, 
since increasing cognitive flexibility is presumed to be preceded by 
increasing differentiation and articulation (and thus high levels of 
the former would not occur without high levels of the latter), it 
would seem that any instrument which "picks out" highly flexible 
individuals would also be selecting out individuals who are relatively 
field-independent, even though it might not be the most effective 
instrument for measuring perceptual field independence. The 
investigations into this question bear this out, although the results 
are far from unequivocal. For example, Houston (1969) found 
slightly better performance on the Stroop CW card for FI subjects 
than for FD subjects, though the difference was not statistically 
significant; however, his use of the raw reading time on CW, rather 
than an interference score (which controls for such personal 
variables as initial color-naming speed in the absence of response 
competition, as well as reading speed), must be regarded as seriously 
confounding his results. Similarly, Denmark, Havlena, and 
Murgatroyd (1971) obtained correlations between scores on the Rod 
and Frame Test (Witkin, et al., 1962) and the Jackson Short Form 
of the Embedded Figures Test (Jackson, 1956) and the three raw 
SCWT scores. When only extreme scores were used, card CW of the 
SCWT correlated .68 with EFT score (p <.01); none of the others were
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significant. However, when continuous data were employed, none of 
the correlations between SCWT and EFT or RFT scores were 
statistically significant. Again, the use of raw rather than 
interference scores confounds these results, as does the use of a 
small (n=24), all-male sample.
Hochman (1971) divided 48 female undergraduates into 3 groups 
(FT, FC, FD) on the basis of Hidden Figures Test performance and 
administered only card CW of the SCWT. An analysis of variance 
determined that there were significant group differences in card CW 
performance (F=3.81, df=2,45, p <.05). This faculty methodology is 
highlighted by Hochman's naive conclusion that "field-independent 
subjects are (thus) less susceptible to stimulus competition than 
field-dependent subjects." Finally, Ray (1974), in a complex design, 
the exact nature of which is beyond the scope of this discussion, 
observed a general tendency for high interference on the Stroop to be 
associated with a FD orientation, but these trends were not significant. 
(Parenthetically, her study lent further support to the explanation 
of Stroop interference in terms of response, rather than stimulus, 
competition.)
Broverman (Broverman & Lazarus, 1958; Broverman, 1960a, 1960b) 
has defined a dimension of cognitive organization he calls conceptual 
vs. perceptual (or sensorimotor) dominance, which he operationalizes 
on the basis of a ratio of SCWT card C performance to card W 
performance. His assumption is that word-reading involves the use of 
a cognitive subsystem different from that used in naming colors, the 
latter being a developmental predecessor of the former and requiring 
less reliance on the utilization of concepts. The greater this ratio,
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the greater the dominance of the conceptual cognitive subsystem; 
the closer this ratio approximates unity (it has never occurred, 
in all published Stroop literature, that C reading time was faster 
than W reading time for any subject, and hence the ratio would 
presumably never be less than one), the greater the dominance of 
the perceptual subsystem. Beyond the differences that Broverman 
claims to have identified in conceptual vs. perceptual dominance 
individuals (and there are many; see, e.g. Jensen & Rohwer, 1966), 
the important one is that a low interference score accompanied by 
a low W/C ratio would presumably indicate a more pervasive lower 
level of cognitive functioning, whereas a low interference score 
accompanied by a high W/C ratio would seem to be indicative of 
higher levels of cognitive flexibility. Although little Stroop 
research has included this variable, it would seem beneficial to do 
so, especially when drawing inferences concerning the variable of 
cognitive flexibility.
To what extent can SCWT performance be accounted for in terms 
of intervening and extraneous variables other than cognitive 
flexibility, such as sex, race, personality correlates, etc.?
The evidence to date is hearteningly sparse that such variables 
appreciably affect Stroop performance.
That there are sex differences in Stroop performance is 
unequivocal: all studies which have examined this variable (e.g.
Stroop, 1935; Jensen, 1965b; Golden, 1974) have found that females 
perform better on Card C than males; most have found that females 
perform better on Card CW as well. However, on the crucial
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interference scores, sex differences are invariably miniscule and 
non-significant. Golden (1974), for example, noted the following 
mean interference scores for 219 subjects: females - 46.24; 
males - 45.48 (t = 0.41, n.s.). Adequate explanation of observed 
sex differences has, unfortunately, eluded Stroop investigators. 
Stroop's (1935) hypothesis of differential practice in naming colors 
for males and females has apparently never been subjects to 
experimental investigation.
Two early studies with predecessors of the Stroop focused on 
racial differences. Peterson, Lanier, and Walker (1925)  administered 
variants of cards W and C to 10- and 12-year old Negroes and 
Caucasians. At 10 years, the Negro children exhibited a 207o lower 
reading and naming rate on both cards than the Caucasian children 
( p < . 0 0 1 ) ,  but by age 12 these differences were small (6 to 87») and 
non-significant. Telford (1930) administered C and W 10 times to 
Negro and Caucasian college students and found no significant racial 
differences overall or for any one trial.
Intelligence bears a most tenuous relationship to Stroop 
performance. Ligon (1932) found a correlation of .02 between 
intelligence and card C reading time (n.s.), and .15 between IQ and 
card W time (p<.01). Three studies have correlated Stroop 
interference (CW-C) with scores on Raven's Progressive Matrices and 
found near-zero coefficients (Callaway, 1959; Leedy, 1963; Jensen, 
1965b).
Personality factors, too, seem rather unrelated, directly or 
indirectly, to Stroop performance. Jensen (1965b), using 436 subjects,
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found only miniscule correlations between interference and the 
Maudsley Personality Inventor (MPI) scales. Golden, Marsella, &
Golden (1975a), using 210 subjects, found the same results with both 
the MPI and Cattell's 16 PF. Golden and Golden (1976) report a 
factor-analytic study of the MMPI performances of 133 subjects 
administered the Stroop, in which they found that subjects 
exhibiting low interferences tend to be self-confident, prone to 
social experimentation, and more aware of their own feelings, as 
well as to view themselves as more mature than others; the authors 
note evidence that suggests that these are characteristics often 
found in creative individuals.
Apart from the previously-mentioned studies with field independence, 
perceptual abilities, too, seem unrelated to SCWT performance.
Thurstone (1944), in his noted factor-analytic study of perception, 
omitted the Stroop from the body of perceptual tests ultimately 
subjected to statistical treatment because of its very low correlation 
with other tests. The results of Podell and Phillips (1959) were 
so muddled as to defy interpretation. In sum, then the repeated 
failures of investigators to find relationships between Stroop 
performance and such variables as intelligence, personality 
dimensions, and perceptual abilities, as well as sex and race, have 
led several individuals (e.g. Jensen and Rohwer, 1966; Golden,
Marsella, and Golden, 1975b) to conclude that Stroop performance, 
rather than being a function of highly specific, localized 
characteristics, taps a very broad and basic, as well as quite stable, 
dimension. There is ample evidence to suggest that this dimension
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may be the extent to which individuals manifest flexibility of 
employment of developmentally-ordered cognitive functions, and that 
this dimension is instrumental in determining the extent to which an 
individual is creative. Golden (1975a), in fact, based upon 
significant correlational relationships found between SCWT 
performance and performance on several little-used measures of 
creativity, has proposed the use of the Stroop in itself as a measure 
of creative productivity.
The economical use of the Stroop in research settings has been 
considerably facilitated by the work of Gardner and Lohrenz (1969) 
and especially Golden (1975b) in developing group-administered 
versions. These involve printing Stroop stimuli on ordinary paper 
(rather than paperboard) and allowing subjects 45 seconds per page 
to silently read each page. Subjects then simply circle the item 
they are on when the time elapses. Errors are rare and, in general, 
are noticed and corrected by subjects. Golden (1975b) administered 
individual forms twice to 30 subejcts and found reliabilities for 
cards W, C, and CW of .86, .82, and .73. For 450 subjects taking the group 
version twice, the reliabilities were .89, .84, and .73, respectively.
For 60 subjects taking both forms (% took the group first), the 
corresponding reliabilities were .85, .81, and .69. The two forms 
are thus functionally equivalent, especially in light of the marked 
practice effects for the first two or three administrations.
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Summary
There exists a wealth of evidence to suggest that creative 
productivity is a function of the extent to which an individual has 
developed a high level of psychological differentiation, that is, 
moved from global, diffuse and syncretic perception to discrete, 
articulated and differentiated perception, as well as the extent 
to which an individual exhibits flexibility of cognitive operations 
and hierarchic integration of those operations, such that develop- 
mentally less mature modes of operation are accessible to use and 
are employed in situations in which they are appropriate. Level of 
psychological differentiation may be measured by the Group Embedded 
Figures Test (Witkin, et al., 1971, 1962); degree of cognitive 
flexibility may be measured by the group form of the Stroop Color-Word 
Test (Golden, 1975b; Stroop, 1935). Creative productivity may be 
measured by the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1962, 
1974).
In examining the variable of creativity, it is desirable to 
account for the effects of intelligence and motivation. In examining 
the variable of cognitive flexibility with the SCWT, it is desirable 
to consider the dimension of conceptual vs. perceptual dominance of 
cognitive operations.
Hypotheses
In light of the evidence amassed to date with respect to the 
variables under consideration in this study, the following
hypotheses are formulated:
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I. A weak and perhaps statistically non-significant Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient will be obtained 
between scores on the measures of perceptual field- 
independence and cognitive flexibility when computed 
across all subjects.
II. Subjects exhibiting high levels of both perceptual field- 
independence and cognitive flexibility will perform 
significantly better on the measure of creativity than 
high FI - low CF and low FI - low CF subjects.
III. High FI - low CF subjects will perform slightly better on 
the measure of creativity than low FI - low CF subjects, 
although this difference may not be statistically 
significant.
IV. There will be no low FI - high CF subjects.
V. There will be no significant group differences on the
measure of conceptual vs. perceptual cognitive dominance.
VI. Small group differences on the intelligence measure will 
emerge, in favor of the high FI - high CF group.
VII. Age will not play a significant role in level of
psychological differentiation or extent of cognitive 
flexibility.
Operational Definitions
Field-Independence. Those subjects falling one standard 
deviation above the mean of the total sample will be classified as 
high FI; those subjects falling one standard deviation below the 
mean of the total sample will be classified as low FI. The measure
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used will be the Group Embedded Figures Test (Witkin, Oltman,
Raskin, and Karp, 1971).
Cognitive Flexibility. Those subjects falling one standard 
above the mean will be classified as high CF; those subjects falling 
one standard deviation below the mean will be classified as low CF. 
The measure used will be the group form of the Stroop Color-Word 
Test (Golden, 1975a).
Creativity. The measure of creativity will be the combined 
figural subtests of the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking 
(Torrance, 1974).
Conceptual vs. Perceptual Cognitive Dominance. The ratio of 
card C to card W of the Stroop Color-Word Test (Golden, 1975a) will 
be used to measure conceptual vs. perceptual cognitive dominance.
Intelligence. The measure of intelligence will be the Revised 






Three hundred and fifty-nine students enrolled in introductory 
psychology during the fall semester at the University of North Dakota 
participated in phase I of the present study in order to earn five 
points of credit to be applied to their grades. Of those 359 
subjects, 132 were male and 227 were female. Ages ranged from 17 to 
33, with a median age of 18.26 and a mean age of 18.89.
Ins trument
Group Stroop Color-Word Test (GSCWT). The GSCWT (Golden, 1975b) 
is a group-administered adaptation of the test first published by 
Stroop (1935). It consists of three pages of 8 \ "  x 11" white paper,
on which are printed, in pica type, the following: page W -- the
words 'red', 'blue' and 'green' in black ink, in 5 columns of 20 
words per column, with columns spaced 1 1/8" apart, and in a 
scrambled fashion, with the stipulation that no word succeeds itself
in a column; page C   groups of four X's in red, blue or green ink,
also in five columns of 20 groups per column, with columns spaced 
1 1/8" apart, and in a scrambled fashion, with the stipulation that
no ink color succeeds itself in a column; page CW --  the color names
from page W printed in the correspondingly-positioned colors from
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page C, in five columns of 20 color-words per column, with columns 
spaced 1 1/8" apart, with the stipulation that no color name is 
printed in the ink color which it names.
Procedure
Subjects were tested during the recitation sections of their 
introductory psychology courses. There were three male and three 
female experimenters. The following instructions were given:
"You are being asked to take a short test of your ability to perform 
highly specialized tasks. Although they are not terribly difficult, 
you are asked to do your very best."
(Page W) On the first page of this test there are 
names of colors printed in columns. When I say 'Go!', 
you are to read the names of the colors to yourself, 
starting at the top of the left column and reading 
down, and then going on to each of the other columns.
Read as quickly as you can. If you make a mistake, 
correct it and go on. If you finish before the time 
is up, start all over again. When I say 'Stop!', circle 
the item you are on. If you are reading the items for 
the second time, put the number 1 beside your circle.
Are there any questions? ....Remember, read down the 
columns as quickly as you can. Go!
After 45 seconds, the experimenter said "Stop! Circle the item you 
are on. If you finished the entire page and began again, put the 
number 1 beside your circle. Turn the page."
(Page C) On this page there are groups of X's printed 
in various ink colors. When I say 'Go!', you are to 
name the ink colors to yourself, starting at the top 
of the left column and going down, and then going 
on to each of the other columns. Name then as quickly 
as you can. If you make a mistake, correct it and 
go on. If you finish before the time is up, start 
all over again. When I say 'Stop!', circle the item 
you are on. If you are reading the items for the
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second time, put the number 1 beside your circle. 
Are there any questions? ...Remember, name the 
ink colors as quickly as you can, reading down the 
columns. Go!
After 45 seconds, the experimenter repeated the instructions given 
upon completion of page W.
(Page CW) On this page there are names of colors 
printed in different ink colors. When I say 'Go!', 
you are to name the ink colors to yourself, ignoring 
the meaning of the words, starting at the top of the 
left column and going down, and then going on to each 
of the other columns. Name then as quickly as you can. 
If you make a mistake, correct it and go on. If you 
finish before the time is up, start all over again.
When I say 'Stop!', circle the item you are on. If you 
are reading the items for the second time, put the 
number 1 beside your circle. Are there any questions? 
...Remember, name the ink colors as quickly as you can, 
ignoring the meaning of the words. Read down the 
columns. Go!
After 45 seconds, the experimenter repeated the instructions given 
upon completion of pages W and C, omitting the phrase "turn the page".
Upon completion of phase I, subjects were debriefed with the 
following mimeographed note:
The experiment in which you have participated is 
part of an ongoing investigation which will not be 
completed for several months. Thus it is not possible 
to fully inform participants concerning the nature 
and purpose of this experiment at this time. However, 
if you wish to be sent a written explanation at a 
future date, please print your name and address at the 
bottom of this sheet and leave it with the experimenter.
A certain number of participants in this experiment 
will be contacted by telephone in the near future and 
asked if they are willing to participate in another 
aspect of this experiment for additional credit.
Thank you for your participation.
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Statistical Analysis
The color-word interference score (CWI) used was obtained by- 
subtracting the number of items read on page CW from the number 
of items read on page C. Thus
CWI = C-CW.
The mean interference score was 38.6; the standard deviation of 
interference scores was 14.3. The range was 0 to 103.
All subjects whose interference score fell in the upper or lower 
seventeen percent of interference scores were contacted by telephone 
and asked to participate in phase II of the experiment. There were 
122 such subjects; 111 indicated their willingness to participate 
further. Seventy-eight of those subjects were female; 33 were male.
Phase II
Ins truments —
Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT). The GEFT (Oltman, Raskin, 
and Witkin, 1971) is a group-administered version of the EFT designed 
by Witkin, et al. (1962), and is intended to be a measure of extent 
of psychological differentiation as evidenced by level of field 
independence. It is published in disposable booklet form and contains 
three sections, of increasing difficulty, in which subjects are asked 
to find and trace one of eight simple figures or designs that are 
embedded in more complex figures. The simple figures are printed on 
the back of the booklet so that subjects may not simultaneously see 
the figures for which they are searching and the complex figures.
The time limit for the first section, which contains seven complex
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figures, is two minutes; however this section is for practice only and 
is not scored. It does, nonetheless, serve as an indicator of whether 
or not the subject understood the directions. Sections two and three 
each contain nine complex figures and have a five-minute time limit.
A single score is obtained by adding to number of correctly identified 
and traced simple figures in sections two and three.
Group Stroop Color-Word Test (GSCWT). The GSCWT was readministered 
to all subjects during phase II in order to obtain a more reliable 
estimate of degree of cognitive flexibility, owing to the oft- 
demonstrated fact that GSCWT performance becomes more stable after 
two or three administrations (see, e.g., Jensen, 1965b).
Procedure
Subjects selected from phase I were tested during one of two 
evening or two afternoon sessions in an auditorium-type classroom.
The order of test administration was determined by a coin toss; the 
GSCWT was administered first during the first and third session and 
the GEFT was administered first during the second and fourth session. 
There was a three-minute rest break between the two tests. All three 
sessions were conducted by a male experimenter.
The same GSCWT instructions used in phase I were used in phase II; 
instructions for the GEFT are printed in the test booklet and the 
experimenter only needed to ask subjects to read the instructions 
and then time them on the three sections.
Upon completion of phase II, subjects were debriefed with an oral 
statement that certain subjects would be asked to participate in the
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final phase of the study. All phase II participants received an 
additional five points of credit.
Statistical Analyses
A single GEFT score and a single CWI score were computed for 
each subject. The mean GEFT score was 12.25; the standard deviation 
of GEFT scores was 4.23. The mean high CF group (that is, those 
falling in the upper 177» with respect to mean performance of all 
phase I subjects) GSCWT score upon the second administration was 
21.2; the mean low CF group (those falling in the lower 17% with 
respect to mean performance of all phase I subjects) GSCWT score upon 
the second administration was 45.9.
Those subjects falling one standard deviation above the mean GEFT 
score were classified as high FI; those subjects falling one standard 
deviation below the mean GEFT score were classified as low FI. On 
this basis, three groups were formed; high FI - high CF (n = 11), 
high FI - low CF (n = 13^, and low FI - low CF (n = 12). There were 
3 low FI - high CF subjects, an insufficient number to permit the 
formation of a fourth group.
Phase III
Sub jects
The thirty-six subjects selected from phase II were sent a brief 
letter (Appendix A) advising them that they would be contacted by 
telephone by a research assistant who would ask them to participate 
in the final phase of the present study. They were briefly advised 
of the considerable effort expended to select subjects with particular 
skills and were asked to participate even if they did not need further
credit for their introductory psychology class. All subjects were, 
however, offered five additional points to be applied to their grades. 
All thirty-six subjects agreed to participate; of those, 14 were male 
and 22 were female.
Instruments
Otis Quick-Scoring Mental Abilities Test, Revised Gamma Form.
The Otis-Gamma (Otis, 1954) is a self-administered intelligence test 
devised in such a manner as to permit group administration. It is 
printed in booklet form with a detachable answer sheet; instructions 
for completing the test are printed on the first page. Although 
the normative data accompanying the Otis-Gamma are now over 20 years 
old, its use was deemed permissible since it was to be used to draw 
inferences concerning intellectual abilities of subjects relative only 
to other subjects in the present study.
Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking, Figural Form A (TTCT). 
Torrance (1974) published both figural (non-verbal) and verbal measures 
of creativity. The figural form, published in booklet form, contains 
three subtests. The Picture Construction Activity requires subjects 
to paste a green egg-shaped figure with an adhesive backing onto a 
blank page and then construct an elaborate picture which incorporates 
that figure. This activity is scored in terms of the originality of 
the basic response and the extent of elaborative detail added to the 
picture. The Incomplete Figures Activity requires subjects to 
amplify upon ten incomplete and abstract figures in order to create a
60
meaningful picture. A fluency score is obtained by adding up the
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number of figures completed. A flexibility score is obtained by adding 
up the number of categories into which the completed figures fall.
In addition, the originality of an extent of elaborative detail added 
to the basic response are scored. The Repeated Figures Activity 
requires the subject to elaborate upon 30 sets of 1 \ "  parallel lines 
in order to create a meaningful picture. Again, responses are scored 
in terms of their fluency, flexibility, originality, and extent of 
elaboration. Each of the three subtests has a ten-minute time limit. 
Torrance (1972) provides normative data for the scoring of all three 
activities.
Procedure
All subjects were tested individually by an examiner of the 
same sex at a time that was mutually convenient. Testing took place 
in small individual-testing rooms. Although standardized instructions 
provided by the test authors were adhered to as strictly as possible, 
examiners were specifically instructed to be warm, open and supportive 
in their interactions with subjects. If subjects required occasional 
reassurance regarding their performance, examiners were instructed 
to give it.
All scoring of phase I and II data was performed by the author, 
who also assigned subjects to groups and to examiners, in order to 
guard against the possibility of examiner bias in subsequent testing.
In addition, subjects' phase III test booklets were identified only 
by the last four digits of their telephone numbers and their sexes, 
in order to guard against scorer bias in the scoring of phase III 
data, which was also carried out by the author.
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Three female and two male undergraduate research assistants 
served as examiners in the collection of phase III data. The order of 
administration of the phase III tests was determined in the following 
manner: each examiner tossed a coin to determine which test to
administer first for his/her first subject; thereafter the two tests 
were alternated.
Statistical Analyses
Analysis of Variance: Age x Cognitive Flexibility. A one-way 
analysis of variance (Winer, 1971) was performed to test whether or 
not age played a significant role in color-word interference on the 
SCWT among the 359 phase I subjects. In addition a Pearson product- 
moment correlation coefficient was computed between the two variables.
Analysis of Variance: Age x Field Independence. A one-way 
analysis of variance was also performed to test whether or not age 
played a significant role in level of field independence on the GEFT 
among the 111 phase II subjects. In addition, a Pearson product- 
moment correlation coefficient was computed between the two variables.
Correlation between the Independent Variables. A Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to determine the 
correlation between degree of cognitive flexibility and degree of 
field independence among 109 phase II subjects (two having been omitted 
because of invalid GSCWT scores).
Analysis of Variance: Group x Perceptual vs. Conceptual Dominance 
Ratio. A one-way analysis of variance was performed in order to 
determine whether there were significant group differences in 
perceptual vs. conceptual cognitive dominance among the phase III subjects.
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Multiple Regression: Group and Intelligence x Creativity. 
Multiple regression analyses (Kerlinger and Pedhazur, 1973) were 
performed to test the major hypotheses of the study: that 
performance on the TTCT could be significantly predicted from group 
assignment and level of intelligence as measured by the Otis-Gamma.
Multiple Regression: Group x IQ and Group x Sex. Further 
multiple regression analyses were carried out to test whether, as 
previously suggested, intelligence plays some role in creativity, 
and whether or not artifactual sex differences in creativity (as a 
function of testing procedure) were obviated.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Age Distribution of Phase I Subjects; Summary Data for GSCWT 
Performance. The distribution of Phase I subjects by age, as well as 
their means and standard deviations of GSCWT performance, are 
presented in Table 3.
TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF PHASE I SUBJECTS BY AGE AND THEIR MEANS AND 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF GSCWT PERFORMANCE
Age n 1 s
17 21 39.24 16.13
18 207 39.27 13.09
19 59 37.02 16.13
20 34 37.94 15.26
21 15 35.8 16.57
22 5 38.4 9.69
23 4 29.0 7.12
24 5 44.2 11.35
25 6 36.0 20.87
26 1 80. 0 .
27 1 37. 0 .
28 1 41. 0 .
33 1 29. 0 .
64
65
Analysis of Variance: Age x Cognitive Flexibility. The results of 
the one-way analysis of variance in which the significance of group 
mean differences in GSCWT performance in phase I was tested on the 
basis of the ages of the 359 subjects participating in that phase 
are presented in Table 4.
TABLE 4
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: AGE x COGNITIVE FLEXIBILITY
Source SS df MS F P
Between 2987.41 12 248.95 1.239 .25
Within 69541.81 346 200.98
To tal 72529.25 358 202.59
The outcome of the correlational analysis was as follows: r = -.033, 
p = .269. These results suggest that age did not play a significant 
predictive role in GSCWT performance, as predicted in hypothesis VII.
Age Distribution of Phase II Subjects; Summary Data for GEFT 
Performance. The distribution of Phase II subjects by age, as well as 
their means and standard deviations of GEFT performance, are presented
in Table 5.
DISTRIBUTION OF PHASE II SUBJECTS BY AGE 




Age n X S
17 4 13.0 1.4
18 65 12.5 4.1
19 22 11.0 4.9
20 11 12.1 4.9
21 4 12.0 3.6
22 1 18. 0.
24 2 11.5 3.5
25 2 15.5 2.1
Analysis of Variance: Age x Field Independence. Table 6 presents 
the results of the one-way analysis of variance in which the 
significance of group mean differences in GEFT performance in 
phase II was tested on the basis of the ages of the 111 subjects 
participating in that phase.
TABLE 6
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: AGE x FIELD INDEPENDENCE
Source SS df MS F P
Between 96.78 7 13.83 .751 .63
Within 1896.14 103 18.41
Total 1992.92 110 18.12
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The outcome of the correlational analysis was as follows: r = .033, 
p = .366. These results, too, support the prediction of hypothesis 
VII that age would not play a significant predictive role in GEFT 
performance.
Correlation between the Independent Variables. It was predicted in 
hypothesis I that a weak and statistically non-significant Pearson 
product-moment correlation coefficient would result when computed 
between the independent variables of GEFT and GSCWT performance.
This prediction was supported: r = 0.029, n = 109, p > .70.
Analysis of Variance: Group x Perceptual vs. Conceptual Cognitive 
Dominance Ratio. Hypothesis V contained the prediction that there 
would be no significant group differences on the perceptual vs. 
conceptual cognitive dominance ratio (CDR). Table 7 contains the 
results of the one-way analysis of variance performed to test that
hypothesis. The means of the three groups were: LFI-LCF --  1.28,
HFI-LCF --- 1.32, HFI-HCF --- 1.41.
TABLE 7
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: GROUP X PERCEPTUAL VS. CONCEPTUAL 
COGNITIVE DOMINANCE RATIO
Source SS df MS F P
Between .104 2 .052 2.675 .084
Within .64 33 .019
Total .744 35 .021
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Although the results are in line with the prediction of hypothesis V, 
the closeness of the obtained F to statistical significance at the 
.05 level suggested the need for further analysis. Therefore, multiple 
t-test comparisons were performed to test for significant differences 
in the individual means from one another. These results are presented 
in Table 8. (All comparisons were one-tailed.)
TABLE 8
MULTIPLE t-test COMPARISONS OF MEANS 
OF COGNITIVE DOMINANCE RATIOS
Comparison t df P
LFI-LCF:HFI-LCF .743 23 .283
LFI-LCF:HFI-HCF -1.944 21 .033
HFI-LCF:HFI-HCF -1.795 22 .044
That the HFI-HCF group subjects had both the lowest interference 
scores and the greatest degree of conceptual cognitive dominance 
suggests that their scores are truly reflective of a high degree of 
cognitive flexibility, rather than a more pervasive lower level of 
cognitive functioning. That the LFI-LCF group subjects had both 
the highest interference scores and the greatest degree of 
perceptual cognitive dominance suggests that their scores are truly 
reflective of a more pervasive lower level of cognitive functioning 
(i.e. low levels of psychological differentiation). The HFI-LCF 
subjects' scores, having fallen almost mid-way between the other 
two groups' scores, suggest that they are somewhat more differentiated
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than the LFI-LCF subjects but are not as able to flexibly employ 
operations characteristic of lower levels of functioning as the 
HFI-HCF subjects. The statistical significance of two of these 
three group mean differences lends substantial weight to these 
hypotheses.
Torrance Test Performance. Table 9 presents the means and standard 
deviations of TTCT subscores for the three groups, as well as means 
and standard deviations of composite creativity scores, based on 
T-score conversions and summations within groups, a procedure outlined 
by Torrance (1974).
That the HFI-LCF group means are all higher than the corresponding 
means for other groups, followed by those for the HFI-HCF group, 
is clearly not in conformity with hypotheses II and III. It would, 
moreover, be inappropriate to attribute these across-the-board 
discrepancies to random variation or imprecision in the dependent 
measure, given their extreme consistency. A discussion of these 
unexpected findings will be deferred until the next chapter.
The obtained TTCT means were subjected to multiple regression 
analyses, using group membership, intelligence (as measured by the 
Otis-Gamma), and the interaction between group membership and 
intelligence as the dependent variables; dummy coding (Kerlinger and 
Pedhazur, 1973) was employed to identify group membership. The 
results of these analyses are presented in Tables 10-11.
TABLE 9
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF GROUP PERFORMANCE ON 
THE TORRANCE TESTS OF CREATIVE THINKING
Fluency Flexibility Originality Elaboration Creativity
mmX s X s X s X s X s
HFI-HCF 17.09 4.83 13.18 2.72 21.64 8.03 81.0 40.46 187.55 31.81
HFI-LCF 18.08 6.09 15.54 4.11 25.38 10.22 88.15 22.15 202.62 36.21
LFI-LCF 15.67 6.32 12.75 5.31 19.42 13.94 50.67 50.67 170.25 50.77
TABLE 10
MULTIPLE REGRESSION: GROUP, IQ x FLUENCY
Source Multiple R R Square F df Source df SS MS F
Group .081 .007 .102 2,30 Regression 5 45.65 9.13 .23
IQ .019 .002 .078 1,30 Res idual 30 1206.24
Group x IQ .093 .009 .135 2,30
Regression .191 .036
TABLE 11
MULTIPLE REGRESSION: GROUP, IQ x FLEXIBILITY
Source Multiple R R Square F df Source df SS MS F
Group .09 .008 .135 2,30 Regression 5 65.96 13.19 .63
IQ .04 .002 .05 1,30 Residual 30 629.60 20.99
Group x IQ .11 • ol .2 2,30
Regression .308 .095
TABLE 12
MULTIPLE REGRESSION: GROUP, IQ x ORIGINALITY
Source Multiple R R Square F df Source df SS MS F
Group .054 .003 .046 2,30 Regression 5 310.99 62.19 .43
IQ .058 .003 .107 1,30 Residual 30 1313.75 143.79
Group x IQ .063 .004 .064 2,30
Regression .259 .067
TABLE 13
MULTIPLE REGRESSION: GROUP, IQ x ELABORATION
Source Multiple R R Square F df Source df SS MS F
Group .019 .0004 .007 2,30 Regression 5 9864.43 1972.89 1.72
IQ .027 .0007 .028 1,30 Residual 30 34474.54 1149.15
Group x IQ .026 .0007 .014 2,30
Regression .472 .223
TABLE 14
MULTIPLE REGRESSION: GROUP, IQ x CREATIVITY
Source Multiple R R Square F df Source df SS MS F
Group .063 .004 .066 2,30 Regression 5 7301.25 1460.25 .75
IQ .004 .000 .000 1,30 Residual 30 58355.50 1945.18
Group x IQ .081 .007 .111 2,30
Regression .333 .111
Thus, none of the creativity scores may be significantly predicted, 
even though the magnitudes of the multiple correlations for them (when 
all predictors are entered in the regression equations) range from .19 
to .47. In part, this may be a function of the high intercorrelations 
among the predictor variables for each dependent variable, as evidenced 
by their very low multiple R's when the effects of all other variables 
are removed from each.
Further multiple regression analyses were carried out in order to 
determine the directions and magnitudes of the relationships between 
group membership and IQ and sex. The results of these analyses are 
presented in Tables 15 and 16.
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TABLE 15





Source df SS MS F
Group .545 .297 Regression 2 950.76 475.38 6.98**
Residual 33 2246.13 68.06
""p < .01
TABLE 16
MULTIPLE REGRESSION: GROUP x SEX
Source Multiple R Source df SS MS F
R Square
Group .242 .059 Regression 2 .501 .251 1.027
Residual 33 8.054 .244
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Thus, a high and statistically significant degree of correlation 
existed between group membership and measured intelligence, a finding 
supportive of previously cited suggestions that creativity and 
intelligence are not independent of one another. A low and non­
significant correlation was observed between group membership and sex, 
perhaps suggesting the efficacy of eliminating sex differences in 
measured creativity by testing with same-sexed examiners.
Post-hoc data analyses were carried out in which scatter- 
plots were constructed between GEFT scores and each of the Stroop 
scores obtained in this study (W, C, CW, CWI, and CDR), in order to 
determine by visual inspection whether the summary data for and 
analyses carried out upon the GEFT and GSCWT masked any relationships 
between these two variables. In addition, multiple regressions 
predicting each of the TTCT scores, as well as the summary creativity 
score, from all other measurement variables under study in this 
investigation (GEFT, IQ, and the 5 GSCWT scores listed above), were 
carried out in order to determine whether any other combination of 
predictor variables significantly enhanced the prediction of TTCT 
scores. However, as no new relationships of interest were uncovered 
in those analyses, those data are not included in this report.
In sum, neither age nor sex bore a systematic relationship to the 
independent variables of field independence or cognitive flexibility; 
intelligence did, however. A very low correlation between the two 
independent variables was observed. The three groups formed on the 
basis of field independence and cognitive flexibility estimates were 
found to differ significantly on the cognitive dominance ratio but
not on the five dependent variables used to operationalize creative 
abilities. The HFI-LCF subjects performed most creativity, followed 




It would perhaps be helpful at this point to very briefly 
review the major findings of this investigation and indicate the 
extent to which they are in accordance with the hypotheses advanced. 
First, it was found that neither cognitive flexiblity, as measured 
by the GSCWT, nor field independence, as measured by the GEFT, could 
be significantly predicted by the ages or sexes of the subjects. 
Further, a very low correlation was observed between GSCWT and GEFT 
performance. All of these findings are in accordance with the 
predictions set forth in Chapter II: good measures of FI and CF 
should not be in large part a function of such demographic variables 
as age and sex; furthermore, Wernerian theory predicts that 
psychological differentiation may or may not be followed by 
hierarchic integration, leading to the prediction of a low 
correlation between GEFT and GSCWT scores across a large number of 
subjects.
The GSCWT cognitive dominance ratio was computed in order to 
further substantiate the validity of the GSCWT as a measure of 
cognitive flexibility. HFI-HCF subjects exhibited the lowest degree 
of interference, coupled with the greatest degree of conceptual 
dominance, suggesting that they were indeed the most flexible. 
LFI-LCF subjects had the highest degree of interference and the
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greatest degree of perceptual dominance, leading to the conclusion 
that they were the least flexible subjects. HFI-LCF subjects as a 
group fell between the other two groups, resulting in the conclusion 
that they were more differentiated than the LFI-LCF subjects but less 
flexible than the HFI-HCF subjects. Two of the three individual 
differences among means were statistically significant (p < .05).
It was further observed that group membership (i.e. GSCWT and 
GEFT scores) could be significantly predicted from IQ scores; this 
was as predicted, given the common-sense notion that creativity and 
intelligence are not orthogonal dimensions.
The major hypotheses in this study concerned which subjects would 
be the most creative performers on the TTCT: it was predicted that 
the HFI-HCF subjects would be the most creative, followed by the 
HFI-LCF subjects and then the LFI-LCF subjects. In point of fact, 
the HFI-LCF subjects were found to have performed most creatively, 
followed by the HFI-HCF subjects and then the LFI-LCF subjects; 
these differences were consistent across all four subtests, as well 
as the composite creativity score. However, none of the TTCT score 
differences could be significantly predicted; this could have been a 
function of any of several factors, including the small sample sizes 
employed, the rather high variability within groups on TTCT 
performance, the high intercorrelations of the predictor variables, 
or simply the lack of large discrepancies between the means.
How might the deviations of the creativity scores from the 
predicted directions be explained? Several hypotheses may be advanced, 
none of which are entirely convincing or satisfactory in and of
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themselves. First, the fault might lie with the construct validity 
of the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking. This appears somewhat 
implausible for two reasons: a) the extreme consistency of relative 
group standings across subscores observed in this study, which seems 
to suggest that whatever the Torrance tests measure, they measure it 
reliably; b) the lengthy array of evidence put forth by Torrance 
(1974) in support of the validity of his tests.
Second, the fault might lie with the GSCWT as a measure of 
cognitive flexibility. For example, although the GSCWT requires the 
subordination of a developmentally more advanced response (word-reading) 
in favor of a more primitive response (color-naming), the emitted 
response must be verbally encoded prior to emission. Thus, there are 
two types of inputs (word name, which is encoded verbally, and color, 
which is encoded on a visuo-spatial level) but only one type of 
output, since both word-reading and color-naming require verbal 
encoding. In order to perform the desired task, subjects must respond 
to the stimulus (color) in a different mode than that in which it was 
encoded. This switching between modes for each response to the 
Stroop stimuli might be viewed as cognitive flexibility. However, as 
subjects were tested in large groups on the GSCWT, there is no 
assurance that the high CF were actually performing the translation 
of the color-name into a verbal form, as they were instructed: they 
may have moved on to succeeding stimuli after having only processed 
the color properties of the Stroop stimuli on a non-verbal level.
Thus, rather than measuring cognitive flexibility, the GSCWT may have 
measured the adeptness of some subjects at short-circuiting color-word
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interference by processing the Stroop stimuli on a strictly visuo- 
spatial level. In order to obviate this perversion of the task 
involved, it would probably be necessary to require vocal responses 
to the color properties of the stimulus, as is usually done when the 
test is administered individually.
Another way in which the task might have been perverted would 
have been to allow one's eyes to go out of focus or (for those with 
vision defects) to raise one's glasses, in order that the word name 
not be received as input. However, if a number of low CF subjects 
were being placed in the high CF group because of their use of any 
of the above tactics, one would probably expect that the variances 
of the HFI-HCF group would be higher than those for the other groups 
on all of the dependent measures, and in fact this is only true for 
the elaboration subscore. Even so, this may, at a minimum, explain 
how three subjects came to be categorized as LFI-HCF, in obvious and 
flagrant contravention of Wernerian theory.
A footnote to the consideration of possible flaws in the GSCWT 
for use in this type of research: if, indeed, large numbers of high 
CF subjects were "cheating" on the measure of flexibility, perhaps the 
predicted ordering of creativity scores could be obtained by suggesting 
that those subjects deserve to have a few points added on to their 
TTCT scores for discerning such clever ways of muddling research 
results. If there is a moral involved, it would seem to be that one 
should never under-estimate the ingenuity of Psychology 101 students 
(or the suspiciousness of novice researchers in pursuit of master's 
degrees).
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Third, the fault may lie with the GEFT as a measure of 
psychological differentiation. It must be remembered that this 
instrument does not measure differentiation directly; rather, it 
measures it by way of what Witkin, et al. (1962) called the "tracer 
element" of perceptual field-independence. Although the various 
embedded figures tests have a long history of use (and perhaps abuse), 
usually with apparent success, it must be borne in mind that with 
each step by which one is removed from the variable of interest, 
the possibility of invalidity of measurement of that variable 
increases at an alarming rate. Thus it would be hazardous to 
speculate what other variables might be measured instead of or 
along with psychological differentiation. Even so, an opposite 
stand may be taken: Wernerian theory would predict that FI subjects 
as a whole would be more creative than FD subjects, and that was 
decidedly the result obtained in this study.
Fourth, and perhaps not last, it may be that Wernerian theory is 
inappropriate in the explanation of what underlies the constellation 
of abilities herin collectively referred to as creativity. Wernerian 
theory has the advantage of immense intuitive appeal. But intuitive 
appeal is not enough. To have utility, a theory must predict 
successfully. An area of growing interest in neuropsychology is the 
study of the specialization of cerebral hemispheres for different 
functions, the left for verbal and mathematical functions, the right 
for spatial and musical functions. There exists a body of literature, 
both empirical and theoretical, suggesting that creative abilities are 
predominantly a right-hemisphere function (e.g. Harnad, 1972; Bakan,
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1975). It seems logical to hypothesize that Werner's notion of 
differentiation and articulation of functions may be a function of 
extent of hemispheric specialization, and that his notion of 
hierarchic integration may be a function of the extent to which the 
individual can process information on a dynamic interhemispheric 
basis, that is, first in one hemisphere and then the other. If this 
hypothesis is true, the observations that creative abilities are 
predominantly a right-hemisphere function would be inconsistent with 
Wernerian theory.
This line of reasoning may be applied to GEFT and GSCWT 
performance as well. It may be possible to explain performance on the 
former as a function of extent of hemispheric specialization and the 
latter as a function of ability to process information first in one 
hemisphere and then the other, this representing a higher (and not 
always achieved) level of development. Even so, Tucker (1977) has 
recently advanced an hypothesis concerning the embedded figures tests 
in which he speculates that performance on them may be a function of 
bilateral hemispheric processing, as evidenced by nonlateral eye 
movements in response to reflective questions (see, e.g., Kinsbourne, 
1972) in both college students and adults. An analogous Wernerian 
explanation might be that the individual must attend to the complex 
figure as a whole in order to be able to select out a specified part 
of it, i.e. must attend both globally and analytically simultaneously.
In sum, then, the present research, like so much research, seems 
to have generated more questions than answers. The predicted results 
were not obtained; was this a function of any (or all) of the four
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previously-offered explanations? Perhaps the most that can be said 
at this point is that an anomaly has been observed; fully adequate 
explanation must be deferred until further questions are answered. 
These include:
a) What is the role of cerebral hemispheric specialization in 
the application of Werner's orthogenetic principle to 
creative abilities?
b) What precisely is the locus of the Stroop phenomenon and 
can it be used as an index of cognitive flexibility?
c) What variables other than perceptual field-independence 
covary with psychological differentiation and how do they 
complicate our measurement of such differentiation?
APPENDIX A
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LETTER REQUESTING THE PARTICIPATION 
OF SUBJECTS SELECTED FOR PHASE III 
TESTING
Department of Psychology- 
University of North Dakota 
Grand Forks,
North Dakota 58202 
October 31, 1977
Dear
Within the next few days you will be contacted by telephone by a 
member of my research team and asked to participate in the final 
phase of study #11.
Nearly 400 students have been screened to find 36 individuals who 
possess certain highly specialized traits. Obviously a great deal 
of time, effort and money has been expended to select those 
individuals. Thus, even if you already have accumulated the five 
hours of research participation you need, I would very much 
appreciate your spending just one more hour participating in 
this study. If you still lack the number of hours you need, I 
would very much appreciate your reserving one of those hours 
for the final phase of this study.
The final phase of Study #11 will entail your meeting on an individual 
basis with one of us at a time of your choosing to take a few short 
tests. Again, I urge you to devote just one more hour to this study. 
Thank you for your cooperation and patience.
Sincerely,
Joel P. Newman 
Graduate Student
urr  - ■A ’
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